It is uncommon for Lithuanian government officials to make statements that are prominently featured in international news outlets. Lithuania’s allies do not even regard its perspectives as a high priority. Nevertheless, it is possible that the timing has altered.
Gabrielius Landsbergis, Lithuania’s foreign minister, issued the subsequent warning in the wake of the Munich security conference in February:
We don’t lack capacity, we lack the political will and urgency necessary to support Ukraine and maintain our collective security. Russia, on the other hand, has the will to destroy Ukraine and reestablish the Russian Empire. When will we start using our capacity to deter this?
It is feasible that Lithuania, with a population of only 3 million, would not be expected to assume a leadership role in Europe’s response to Russian aggression. Nevertheless, the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, which was marked by repression, persecution, and a totalitarian regime, is a subject that the youth have a profound understanding of. It is logical to give greater weight to the perspectives of Lithuania and its neighboring countries than those of other nations. Then, why does this not transpire?
In 2008, Vytautas Landsbergis, the country’s inaugural president of the parliament following its independence from the Soviet Union, foresaw this conflict. He bluntly responded to a European news website’s inquiry about the “situation in Georgia” by stating, “It is not the situation in Georgia only; it is a very terrible situation in Europe, and for Europe’s future, and very promising.” Who succeeds Georgia? Next, Ukraine is on the agenda.
At that time, the EU foreign ministers had reached a consensus that was diametrically opposed to this perspective, expressing “severe concern” about the conflict. Despite Georgia’s condemnation of Russia’s disproportionate response, the country was compelled to sign a six-point armistice agreement that essentially authorized Russian “security forces” to implement “additional security measures.” Russia continues to occupy twenty percent of Georgian territory as a consequence of the armistice agreement.
While Russia occupied Crimea in 2014, other European Union member states simultaneously advanced their energy collaborations with the aggressor and reached a consensus on specific sanctions. Conversely, Lithuania established its own liquefied natural gas terminal, which it named “Independence,” thereby achieving independence from Russian gas.
When EU countries were hesitant to identify the Russian Federation as an aggressor in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine in 2015, the Lithuanian ambassador to the UN made a clear statement: “Russia is a direct party to this conflict and bears the primary responsibility for the conflict that is tearing into Ukraine’s flesh.”
How should we respond to Russia?
By 2022, Russia had implemented an all-encompassing offensive against Ukraine. Tangible assistance was relatively scarce, despite the overwhelming verbal support. Germany withheld approval, preventing Estonia from sending its old howitzer artillery weapons and refusing to send weapons to Ukraine during the initial days of the conflict.
Meanwhile, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland were raising the alarm regarding the threat the situation posed to the rest of the region and urging Europe to provide Ukraine with “every available means.” There are numerous individuals in the region who believe that Europe should unambiguously pledge its support for Ukraine’s triumph in the conflict.
French President Emmanuel Macron only recently suggested that Ukraine should relinquish a portion of its sovereignty in order to satisfy Putin’s demands. The Baltic and eastern European nations responded with contempt to these statements.
Macron encountered opposition from numerous European capitals when he altered his strategy to indicate that he did not exclude the possibility of deploying troops to Ukraine. In Lithuania, he ultimately found an ally.
Image Source: Wikipedia/NuclearVacuum
Westsplaining that is persistent
This historical perspective emphasizes the significant disparity in perspectives between the countries of western Europe (France, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, and the Czech Republic) and those of eastern and central Europe. This suggests that “westsplaining” continues to dominate the European Union.
There has never been a selection of candidates from Eastern Europe for critical positions, such as the secretary general of NATO. In reality, Frans Timmermans, a former vice president of the European Commission, and at least one other Commission official have advised them against it.
Western Europe continues to perceive Eastern Europe and the Baltics as partners in an unequal manner. As a result, the EU continues to lack a genuine perception of Russia as a direct threat to European security, despite the fact that it is dominated by the West.
In her 2022 annual state of the union address, EU Commission president Ursula Von der Leyen expressed her appreciation for the voices within the union, including those in Poland, the Baltics, and throughout central and eastern Europe: “We should have listened to the internal perspectives.”
This moment of transitory recognition should serve as an impetus for a more substantive discourse regarding the decision-making process within the EU and the rationale behind it.
